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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Anthony Edward Ortega appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of felony injury to child. Ortega contends 
the district court erred in allowing the admission of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and in 
failing to give a non-pattern jury instruction that he requested. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Ortega called 911 to report he was helping his two-year-old son, AJ.O., 
out of the car seat when AJ.O. slipped and fell and that he thought AJ.O.'s arm 
was broken. (Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.1-23, p.198, Ls.2-4; Exhibit 1.) When 
paramedics arrived on scene, they found AJ.O. lying on the ground and Ortega 
standing nearby. (Trial Tr., p.136, L21 - p.137, L.4.) AJ.O. was "crying quite a 
bit," was not moving his left arm, and his left palm was face down on the ground. 
(Trial Tr., p.137, L 13.) Paramedic Brena McKenna noticed AJ.O.'s arm had a 
red band "just above the radius and the ulna," that was a couple of inches wide 
and there was swelling. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.18-24.) When asked what 
happened, Ortega claimed he was trying to lift AJ.O. out of his car seat when 
A.J.O.'s leg "must have got caught" and AJ.O. fell on the ground and landed on 
his left arm. (Tr., p.138, L17 - p.139, L.1.) However, Paramedic McKenna 
noted the car seat was "strapped in correctly" and she "didn't see any straps or 
anything on the floor." (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.5-11.) Paramedics placed a splint on 
AJ.O.'s arm, secured him on a gurney, and transported him to the hospital. 
(Trial Tr., p.139, L18 - p.141, L13, p.142, Ls.15-23, p.144, Ls.10-13.) 
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At the hospital, Dr. Steven Wyman examined AJ.O. (Trial Tr., p.255, 
Ls.17-22, p.260, Ls.7-11.) That examination revealed that AJ.O. had a spiral 
fracture of his left arm - a type of fracture that is not common in children and 
would not commonly occur as a result of a fall from a car as described by 
Ortega. (Trial Tr., p.270, LA - p.273, L2.) Rather, spiral fractures generally 
occur as a result of the arm being "trapped" or "held and turned as the child was 
falling, or grabbed, or something of that nature." (Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.3-10.) 
Dr. Wyman also noted AJ.O. had "unusual bruising" on his "right upper 
extremity and the buttocks." (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.3-6, p.277, Ls.5-7.) In addition, 
there was "linear bruising" on AJ.O.'s right arm that was "suspicious for possibly 
like a hand print." (Trial Tr., p.277, Ls.2-4.) Because of AJ.O.'s injuries, Dr. 
Wyman was not "comfortable discharging [him] home." (Trial Tr., p.273, LS.1S-
19.) Dr. Wyman, therefore, "asked to speak with the pediatrician so that the 
child could be admitted and additional workup and evaluation could be done." 
(Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.20-24.) 
Law enforcement was also dispatched to the hospital to investigate 
further. (Trial Tr., p.223, L23 - p.224, L24.) Upon arrival, Officer David Gomez 
interviewed Ortega who told him he was trying to train AJ.O. to get out of the car 
by himself and "grabbed" him by the left hand as AJ.O. was getting out of the 
car. (Trial Tr., p.225, L.5 - p.226, LA.) Ortega said he was distracted for a "brief 
second" and when he "brought his attention back, [AJ.O.] had fallen on the 
ground." (Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.5-S.) Ortega repeated a similar story to others. 
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(Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.13-18, p.288, L.17 - p.289, L.3, p.337, L.15 - p.338, L.2, 
p.368, Ls.2-8.) 
A day after A.J.O. was admitted to the hospital, he was examined by Dr. 
Paul McPherson, the medical director at CARES. (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.13-23, 
p.296, Ls.6-13.) Dr. McPherson obtained a history from A.J.O.'s great 
grandmother, Carma Pirrong, who said she had "seen bruises before for about a 
month-and-a-half on A.J."1 (Trial Tr., p.298, Ls.12-21.) Dr. McPherson also 
received information about Ortega's explanation of A.J.O.'s arm fracture and 
claim that A.J.O. had bruises on his buttocks from sitting on the toilet 
seat during potty-training efforts. (Trial Tr., p.299, L.3 - p.300, L.5.) Dr. 
McPherson agreed with Dr. Wyman that a spiral fracture is generally the result of 
a twisting mechanism and is "less likely" to occur by falling. (Trial Tr., p.301, L.9 
- p.302, LA.) Dr. McPherson explained that the "amount of force that would 
have taken to cause that kind of fracture is more than if you were just picking 
your child up by under the arm or elbow during normal play or normal care." 
(Trial Tr., p.320, L.25 - p.321, LA.) In fact, the "amount of force required to 
cause such an injury is enough that a reasonable person would know that they 
could harm a child." (Trial Tr., p.321, Ls.5-7.) 
Dr. McPherson also noted A.J.O.'s numerous bruises - including bruises 
on A.J.O.'s buttocks, chest, and abdomen. (Trial Tr., p.313, L.9 - p.314, L.6; 
Exhibits 6-9, 25-28.) Those bruises are "[v]ery uncommon in kids, even from 
1 A.J.O. did not have the verbal skills to explain how he was injured. (Trial Tr. 
p.298, L.22 - p.299, L.2.) 
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accidental falls or household falls." (Trial Tr., p.313, L.9 - p.314, L.5.) Further, 
testing showed that A.J.O. does not have a bleeding disorder that would explain 
his bruises nor did he have a bone disease. (Trial Tr., p.315, Ls.7-24, p.320, 
Ls.7-17.) Like the spiral fracture, the amount of force necessary to cause the 
bruises observed on A.J.O. "could have likely caused great bodily harm." (Trial 
Tr., p.321, Ls.8-15.) Accordingly, like Dr. Wyman, Dr. McPherson was also 
concerned about A.J.O.'s safety. (Trial Tr., p.320, LS.17 -19.) 
Based on A.J.O.'s fractured arm and his bruises, a grand jury indicted 
Ortega on two counts of felony injury to child. (R., pp.22-23.) The state also 
filed an Information Part II alleging Ortega is a persistent violator. (R., pp.55-55, 
50-52.) 
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to use evidence pursuant to 
I.R.E.404(b). (R., pp.71-72.) Specifically, the state sought to present evidence 
from Byron Stewart that Ortega previously "grabb[ed] his son A.J.O. by the bicep 
and yank[ed] him around." (R., pp.71-72.) The state asserted the evidence was 
admissible under LR.E. 404(b) to "prove knowledge, and/or to rebut any claim of 
accidental touching." (R., pp.71-72.) The court granted the state's motion. 
(10/15/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25.) Ortega filed a motion to reconsider, arguing 
Stewart was not present at the scene of this accident and he has no direct 
knowledge of the events leading to the injury" and that his "testimony is not 
relevant to whether Mr. Ortega committed the crime as alleged in Count I of the 
indictment and would serve to improperly paint Mr. Ortega as an abusive father." 
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(R., p.88.) Ortega further objected to testimony from A.J.O.'s grandmother and 
great-grandmother regarding other disciplinary actions Ortega took against 
A.J.O. (R., p.88.) Ortega argued the evidence was inadmissible because it 
could not and "has not been directly linked to the injuries as stated in Count 
Two." (R., p.88.) The court denied Ortega's motion to reconsider. (10/22/2012 
Tr., p.21, Ls.1-5.) 
The jury found Ortega guilty of both counts alleged in the Indictment and 
. 
also found he is a persistent violator. (R., pp.140-141, 144.) The court imposed 
unified sentences of ten-years with five years fixed on both counts and ordered 
the sentences to run concurrent. (R., pp.148-150.) Ortega filed a timely notice 
of appeal. (R., pp.153-155.) 
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ISSUES 
Ortega states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred by allowing the State to present 
evidence of prior bad acts that were irrelevant to any legitimate 
issues. 
2. Whether the district court erred by not giving the requested jury 
instruction on reasonable parenting efforts. 
(Appellant's Brief, pA.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ortega failed to show error in the district court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling? 
2. Has Ortega failed to show the district court erred in declining his request 
for an unapproved jury instruction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ortega Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling 
A. Introduction 
Ortega complains that the district court erred in allowing evidence of "prior 
bad acts" because, he argues, he did "not put intent at issue" nor was "'absence 
of accident' implicated in this case." (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-8.) A review of the 
record and the law shows otherwise. Ortega has, therefore, failed to show error 
in the district court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,51,205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
C. Ortega Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) 
Ruling 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a 
defendant's criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible for 
a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Truman, 150 
Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). Other proper 
purposes include proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
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knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. 
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 
87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). As long as the evidence is relevant to 
prove some issue other than the defendant's character and its probative value 
for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair 
prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 
227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,275-76,77 P.3d 956,964-65 (2003). 
On appeal, Ortega argues evidence of his prior disciplinary actions 
against A.J.O. was inadmissible because, he claims, he "did not put intent at 
issue" and his claim that A.J.O.'s arm was broken as a result of an accident, "did 
not implicate the question of intent." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) As an initial 
matter, Ortega does not identify in his argument what evidence he claims was 
not properly admitted. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7 -9.) While he details 
various testimony in the factual background section of his brief (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.2-3), nowhere does he explain why each prior act was allegedly inadmissible; 
instead, he generally characterizes all of the testimony about his conduct as 
evidence of his "parenting techniques" and claims such evidence was not 
admissible. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Distinguishing between the acts is, 
however, necessary for purposes of determining their relevance and, in one 
instance, the admission of the testimony was during cross-examination and, 
therefore, was invited by Ortega. 
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Although the state sought a pre-trial ruling on whether it could admit 
testimony from Stewart that he previously saw Ortega grab AJ.O. by the "bicep 
and yank[] him around" (R., p.71), and the district court concluded that evidence 
would be admissible, the prosecutor never asked Stewart about that particular 
incident on direct-examination2 (see generally Trial Tr., pp.184-193). Instead, 
Ortega inquired about the incident on cross-examination, asking: "in terms of 
any contact with AJ.'s arm, the last time that you indicate you saw [Ortega] do 
anything with AJ.'s arm was in January of 2012; correct?" (Trial Tr., p.194, 
Ls.10-14.) It was not until after that the prosecutor followed up on redirect and 
asked Stewart to describe what it was he saw Ortega do to AJ.O.'s arm. (Trial 
Tr., p.195, Ls.3-3-16.) Stewart testified that Ortega was trying to get AJ.O.'s 
attention and "grabbed him by his arm, and he, you know, snapped him around 
so that he would, instead of running away from him, was facing him in a quick 
jerk motion." (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.12-16.) Thus, although the district court had 
previously ruled the evidence was admissible, the introduction of the evidence 
was invited by Ortega himself; as a result, he should be foreclosed from 
complaining of any error in relation to its admission. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 
389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000) (a party is estopped, under the doctrine 
2 The prosecutor did, however, ask Stewart about an incident in which Ortega 
slapped AJ.O. in the mouth, causing his lips and gums to bleed and that Ortega 
had also left a mark on Stewart's son's neck from disciplining him. (Trial Tr., 
p.187, L.3 - p.188, L.10.) Stewart also testified that he saw Ortega "swat 
[AJ.O.] on the butt a couple times, but it was really nothing more than ... an 
attention getter" and that Ortega "would sometimes leave AJ. on the potty and 
on the toilet for extended periods of time, which [Stewart] felt was unnecessary." 
(Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.3-19.) 
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of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the 
party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error); see State v. Gardiner, 
127 Idaho 156, 162,898 P.2d 615, 621 (Ct. App. 1995) (testimony of prior acts 
admissible after defense "opened the door"). 
Even if Ortega's complaint regarding Stewart's testimony about the prior 
incident involving Ortega grabbing AJ.O.'s arm was not invited, contrary to 
Ortega's claim, it was relevant to rebut Ortega's claim that AJ.O.'s broken arm 
was the result of an accident rather than the result of Ortega intentionally 
grabbing AJ.O. by the arm to remove him from the car or for some other 
disciplinary purpose. Ortega's claim that such testimony would only be relevant 
if he "grabbed the victim's arm to get his attention (engaged in the action with 
innocent intent)" lacks merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) State v. Hassett, 124 Idaho 
357, 859 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1993), is instructive and supports the district court's 
conclusion that the evidence was relevant. 
In Hassett, the defendant was charged with felony injury to child as a 
result of injuries sustained by his month-old son. 124 Idaho at 358, 859 P.2d at 
956. Hassett claimed the infant's various injuries were the result of either 
accidents or his efforts to aid the child. kL. at 359-360, 859 P.2d at 957-958. To 
refute this claim, the district court allowed the state to admit evidence of prior 
abuse Hassett inflicted on his four-month-old daughter. 124 Idaho at 360-361, 
859 P.2d at 958-959. The Court of Appeals agreed the evidence was 
admissible, noting: "Given the contradictory evidence and the variety of 
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defenses asserted by Hassett, the issues of intent and absence of accident or 
mistake were directly at issue." The Court further reasoned: 
Hassett was charged with violating I.C. § 18-1501(1) and 
willfully causing or permitting: J.H. to suffer; or inflicting upon him 
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering; or causing or 
permitting him to be placed in a situation endangering him or his 
health when in Hassett's care or custody. The question of 
Hassett's intent, expressed as "willful" action in the statute and in 
the prosecutor's charging document, make Hassett's intent 
material, and opens the door for introduction of evidence of prior 
bad acts offered by [the I.R.E. 404(b) witnesses]. 
Hassett, 124 Idaho at 362, 859 P.2d at 960. 
As in Hassett, the state charged Ortega with violating I.C. § 18-1501(1), 
alleging he "willfully caus[ed] or permit[ted] [AJ.O.] to suffer unjustifiable physical 
pain or mental suffering." (R., pp.22-23.) Ortega's intent was, therefore, at issue 
and evidence related to his intent and to the absence of mistake or accident in 
relation to AJ.O.'s broken arm (Count I) was relevant and admissible. Ortega's 
claim to the contrary fails. 
Ortega's claim that any other evidence of his "parenting techniques" was 
inadmissible also fails. Again, evidence of Ortega's sometimes-aggressive 
disciplinary acts was relevant to his intent in relation to Count II, which was 
based on the bruises on AJ.O.'s buttocks, abdomen, and chest (R., p.23), and 
contradicted Ortega's assertion that the bruising on the buttocks was merely the 
result of sitting on a toilet seat during potty training exercises. 
Ortega's claim that the prior act evidence was inadmissible because he 
does not think his intent or the absence of mistake or accident were implicated in 
this case is belied by the record and is unsupported by the law. 
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Ortega next argues that, even if the evidence was relevant, it was 
"minimally probative as to the injuries alleged in the indictment, considering none 
of the witnesses offering the propensity evidence testified that they saw Mr. 
Ortega do anything to cause those injuries." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) This 
argument is nonsensical. If one of the witnesses testified to personally 
witnessing Ortega inflict the injuries for which he was charged, such testimony 
would not be evaluated under I.R.E. 404(b) because it would relate to the very 
acts with which Ortega was charged, not prior uncharged acts. There is simply 
no requirement that witnesses providing evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) also be 
eye-witnesses. 
Ortega's alternative argument is that the "district court's assessment of 
the evidence under I.R.E. 403 focused only on the temporal proximity of the 
alleged uncharged conduct to the charged conduct." (Appellant's Brief, p.10 
(emphasis added).) This assertion is untrue. The entirety of the court's analysis 
under I.R.E. 403's balancing requirement was: 
Well, this evidence is highly relevant. It's close in time, it's 
close in manner. It seems to me to establish a pattern of -- at a 
minimum, a pattern that is relevant to the resolution of the issues in 
this case. 
I think its probative value outweighs substantially any 
prejudicial effect, so I'm going to permit evidence of this type. It's 
close enough in time. It's the type of conduct that is particularly 
relevant, and it seems to me that this is properly admitted. 
(10/15/2012 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-11.) 
While the district court undoubtedly noted the "temporal proximity" of the 
prior acts, which is a relevant consideration, Hassett, 124 Idaho at 363, 859 P.2d 
12 
at 961, the record does not support Ortega's assertion that the court "only" 
focused on "temporal proximity." Ortega cannot meet his burden by picking out 
words that suit his argument and ignoring others that do not. 
Ortega has failed to meet his burden of showing evidentiary error. 3 
II. 
Ortega Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed Instructional Error When It 
Denied His Request For An Unapproved Jury Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Ortega asserts the court erred by denying his request for an unapproved 
jury instruction in which he sought to have the court instruct the jury "regarding 
his rights to reasonably punish his child." (Appellant's Brief, p.11; R., p.84.) A 
review of the applicable legal standards shows the district court correctly 
concluded that Ortega was not entitled to such an unapproved instruction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009). 
C. Ortega's Instructional Error Claim Fails 
Refusal of a defendant's requested instructions dealing with the defense 
theory is not error where the proposed statement is an erroneous statement of 
the law. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 855, 26 P.3d 31, 38 (2001); State v. 
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Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 817 P.2d 646 (1991); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 
736 P.2d 1327 (1987). While the appellate court "has upheld jury instructions 
that do not strictly comply with those contained in the Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions (ICJI)" the Idaho Supreme Court has cautioned that "any court which 
varies from jury instructions previously approved by th[e] Court does so at 
considerable risk that the verdict rendered will be overturned on appeal." State 
v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2003) (quotations and citation 
omitted). If the instructions, as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the law, the 
instructions are not erroneous. kL 
The district court instructed the jury regarding the elements of felony 
injury to child consistent with the pattern instruction for that offense, ICJI 1244. 
(Compare R., pp.130, 132 with ICJI 1244.) The district court also provided the 
jury with the definition of "willfully" that appears in the pattern instruction for ICJI 
1244. (Compare R., p.134 with ICJI 1244.) Ortega, however, requested an 
additional instruction "pursuant to State v. Peters[,] 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App. 
1989)," that he proposed should read as follows: 
The State of Idaho recognizes that a parent may punish a child 
using a reasonable amount of force to safeguard and promote the 
child's welfare. A parent may punish a minor child for wrongdoing 
so long as such punishment is for this beneficial purpose. The 
punishment must not be excessive and the degree of harm to the 
child must not exceed what is commonly viewed as reasonable in 
light of the circumstances. 
(R., pp.84-85.) 
3 Although Ortega did not discuss the evidence of individual acts separately in 
terms of their admissibility, even if this Court finds admission of evidence of any 
individual act or acts error, the state submits the error is harmless. 
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The district court rejected Ortega's request, stating: 
. . . I did consider your additional proposed instruction based on 
State versus Peters. And I decided not to use it, in part because 
it's not one of the recommended jury instructions by the Criminal 
Jury Instructions Committee, but also because the portion of the 
case from which your language is taken is the portion of the case 
that relates to the discussion about why the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague when applied to a situation where a 
parent is unprotective, and so it relates to that portion where the --
it relates to that portion of the case that is deciding whether a 
reasonable person would be put on notice that they could be 
charged under the injury to child statute for failing to protect their 
minor child from treatment by somebody else. 
And I did consider it, but then I also felt that, first, the 
committee didn't go with that but, secondly, the elements of this 
case are drawn directly from the statute. They, of course, are the 
proposed criminal jury instructions from the committee, and the 
statute talks about unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. 
And I believe that that's - encompasses a discussion about 
whether something is unjustifiable or justifiable, and I believe that it 
would be preferable not to create any possible confusion between 
the language used in State versus Peters, which relates to a 
different issue, and the statutory language, which says that you 
can't inflict any unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. 
So "thoroughly" means that there is an implication that there 
are justifiable actions that one could take, and so that's why I 
decided not to use it, is I think that the argument can be made in 
the context of the statutory language and the existing elements, 
and I do think it's a proper argument to make. 
(Trial Tr., p.441 , L.14 - p.443, L.2.) 
The district court was exactly right. Not only was it advisable for the court 
to give the approved instructions, as cautioned by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Young, supra, but the Peters case does not require that Ortega's requested 
instruction be given. As noted by the district court, the Court of Appeals in 
Peters was addressing the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-1501 (1) when it 
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"recognize[d] that a parent may punish a child using a reasonable amount of 
force to safeguard and promote the child's welfare" and that a "parent may 
punish a minor child for wrongdoing so long as such punishment is for this 
beneficial purpose." 116 Idaho at 855,780 P.2d at 606. But, nowhere in Peters 
does the Court state that a trial court is required to instruct the jury accordingly 
when it considers a charge under I.C. § 18-1501(1). Instead, I.C. § 18-1501(1) 
"is clear" that "a parent cannot willfully permit a child to be exposed to great 
bodily injury without threat of criminal sanctions," Peters, supra, and, as the 
district court noted, the elements instruction advises the jury that the actions 
must be willful and unjustifiable in order to find the defendant guilty. 
Ortega nevertheless argues that even if the language from Peters is dicta, 
it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Young, and the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 
2003), which relied on Young. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-16.) Ortega is incorrect. 
At issue in Young and Halbesleben was whether it was proper to give the 
"generalized definition of willfully" from I.C. § 18-101 (1) when instructing the jury 
on the elements of I.C. § 18-1501(1). Young, 138 Idaho at 373,64 P.3d at 299; 
Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 169, 75 P.3d at 223. That generalized definition 
states that '''wilfully,' when applied to the intent with which an act is done or 
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the 
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to ... injure another .... " 
I.C. § 18-101(1). The Court in Young concluded the general definition should not 
be used because "Section 18-1501(1) tells the jury that the State must prove that 
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[the defendant] willfully caused or permitted the child to suffer or inflicted 
unjustifiable physical pain." 138 Idaho at 373, 64 P.3d at 299. Giving the 
general definition of willful, that no intent to injure is required, would be confusing 
at best and misstate the law at worst. Young, 138 Idaho at 373, 64 P.3d at 299. 
The Court of Appeals in Halbesleben, citing Young, unsurprising reached the 
same conclusion. 139 Idaho at 169-170, 75 P.3d at 223-224. 
The concern from Young and Halbesleben does not exist in this case 
because the court did not give the general definition of willful; it gave the 
definition set forth in the felony injury to child pattern instruction. In fact, the I 
prosecutor submitted this instruction, noting that the definition of willfully needed 
to be "tailored" to the felony injury to child charge. (Trial Tr., p.438, L.13 - p.439, 
L.8.) Ortega's reliance on Young and Halbesleben to support his claim that he 
was entitled to some additional instruction beyond those given is without merit. 
Ortega has failed to show any error in his case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Ortega guilty of two counts of felony injury to child. 
DATED this 10th day of February 2014. 
JE: S CA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
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